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Christianity and Society

- Conversation: On the Evanston Assembly's International Affairs Report

NIEBUHR AND FAGLEY

- Christianity and Law: The Fifth Amendment Controversy and the Vindication of the Law

WILLIAM STRINGFELLOW

- The Christianity and Modern Man Lectures

DAVID DEMAREST LLOYD

- Toward An Ethic of Leisure

VAN A. HARVEY

- Editorials
- Book Reviews

CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY

A Quarterly devoted to Christianity and Social Reconstruction

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Table of Contents

	PAGE
Editorials	3
Conversation: On the Evanston Assembly's International Affairs Report	
I. Reinhold Niebuhr	7
II. Richard Fagley	9
Christianity and Law: The Fifth Amendment Controversy and the Vindication of the Law	13
by William Stringfellow	
The Christianity and Modern Man Lectures	18
by David Demarest Lloyd	
Toward An Ethic of Leisure	21
by Van A. Harvey	
Book Reviews	26

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CHRISTIANITY *and* SOCIETY

EDITORIALS

Billy Graham's Christianity and the World Crisis

Billy Graham's appearance on a national television show and his answers to the questions of newspaper reporters fully reveal the almost complete irrelevance of his type of Christianity to the collective problems of our age. This is not an indictment of Billy Graham, who is a reasonably modest and wholly personable young man, who realizes the social implications of the Christian faith sufficiently to insist that segregation is unchristian and who defies the traditions of his own South in his meetings.

The irrelevance of his faith is derived from his wholly individualistic conceptions of sin and his perfectionist ideas of grace. He told the reporters that he was going to Europe because Europe was "strategic" in the world crisis, which is to assume that the conversion about which he speaks will or may affect our collective destiny. How this is to be done is made apparent by the assertion that the "hydrogen bomb was made by man which proves that there is something the matter with man" which religious conversion can cure. The hydrogen bomb does indeed reveal the ambiguity in which the whole human enterprise is involved. But it is not a "wickedness" which the good man can simply renounce while the unredeemed man continues to make bombs. The hydrogen bomb reveals the deep perplexity of our whole culture. When Billy Graham preached to the President of the United States on these issues, the President must have had some uneasy thoughts about this simple analysis, for his own board declared Dr. Oppenheimer a security risk; and the chief reason for the adverse decision was that Dr. Oppenheimer had qualms of conscience about the hydrogen bomb. There is, in short, a simple individualistic and moral-

istic version of the Christian faith which is quite irrelevant to the moral and spiritual perplexities of our age, partly because it does not know how to deal with the collective evils of a civilization and partly because it has too naive conceptions of the "good" that good men can do, being blind to the evil which we must risk in order to avoid a worse evil, for instance risking war in order to avoid war. Our modern predicament about atomic warfare makes nonsense of Billy Graham's version of Christianity as well as of the creed of the rationalistic moralists.

It may be unfair to compare a simple evangelist with the greatest statesman of our age, but it is not unfair to call attention to the fact that Churchill, in his eloquent address in the House of Commons, gave a better exposition of the situation in which we stand than has thus far been given by any religious analysis. The virtue of Churchill's exposition consisted, *inter alia*, of the first clear statement of the fact that the increasing security of the last few years is derived from the increasing awareness of the awfulness of atomic warfare, so that, in Churchill's eloquent phrase, "security is the sturdy child of terror and survival the twin brother of annihilation."

Churchill did not try to declare this ironic, not to say tragic, situation good. He gave a very realistic account of the insecurities in which we live. But he did not offer some simple alternative to this situation, so fraught with irony. Neither conversion in Billy Graham's version of Christianity nor the world government of which our more rationalistic idealists dream can solve the predicament of modern man. There are, however, resources in Biblical faith for un-

derstanding the predicament which will prevent vain resort to false solutions and teach us how to live patiently with a problem which will turn into final tragedy only if we try to solve it either heroically or moralistically.

R. N.

Britain, the USA, and China

Gradually the distance between ourselves and Britain on our respective policies toward China is narrowing despite the efforts of China to widen the breach and of Senator Knowland and Aneurin Bevan to sow discord between us. The British government is not committed to the defense of Formosa, but it tacitly admits our right to do so. We, on the other hand, while committed to the non-recognition of Red China, take step after step which cumulatively spell recognition. Furthermore, our pretended "un-leashing" of the Nationalists seems now to mean their effective leashing. President Eisenhower declared that we would not participate in an "aggressive war" which means that he no longer considers this conflict as an unfinished civil war, waiting only for American support to insure victory for the Nationalists.

Thus the distance between us is obviously narrowing, but the exigencies of Republican politics make it impossible to bridge the final gap between us. That gap is symbolized by the islands of Quemoy and Matsu. The British had a plan for bargaining with the Chinese Communists, using these islands to effect an overall settlement with China. They rightly believe that once the invasion of the mainland is disavowed, these islands which are close to the mainland are no longer useful. The State Department, on the other hand, fears the psychological effect of turning them over. That, at least, is the theory. It is more likely that it fears Senator Knowland, for our government must always consider the remnants of the "China lobby" which maintained for years that the Nationalists were merely the victims of the bungling of the Democratic Administration. Secretary Dulles aroused British public opinion by the equivocal statement that we were not interested in

the islands "as such." He has since assured Chiang Kai-shek that we would not sacrifice the islands without the consent of the Nationalists. This assurance represents the still unbridged gulf between us and Britain. But the gulf has been narrowed so greatly in recent months that one dares to hope that it will finally be bridged.

Whether or not it will be depends largely on American political developments, chiefly upon Eisenhower's ability and willingness to consolidate the moderate Republican sentiment on foreign policy and readiness to defy the Republican right wing, headed by his own Senate minority leader.

This whole problem is an object lesson in the tortuous processes of history and proves how many wheels within wheels there are in the machinery of historical development. It also shows that two nations, in this case the two Anglo-Saxon nations, who are determined to get along with each other and who know how much depends upon such cooperation, can, in time, iron out any difficulties. They can do this even when the enemy (in this case the Chinese Communists) accentuates every element of discord between them. The policy of accentuating discord accounts for the fact that the much more exposed Hong Kong is safe from attack while the island of Formosa is constantly challenged.

R. N.

The South African Tragedy

The tragic drama in South Africa seems to be moving toward a climax with the government's forcible transfer of the Negro population from its former quarters in Johannesburg, called "Sophietown." The Negroes are making what resistance they can to this new turn of the screw of injustice, but they probably cannot avail against the government's police power. Among the white Christians who have sought to make common cause with the Negroes is Father Huddleston who is refusing to move his school to a new location. Before these lines are read it will be known whether the government will have punished his defiance by jailing him.

The whole business in South Africa is reminiscent of the Nazi treatment of the Jews; and the analogy proves that once a community embarks upon the policy of making distinctions between human beings and of annulling the rights of some because of a difference in race or some other contingency, it is on a slippery slope which leads to disaster. The disaster results from some inhuman cruelty which ostensibly denies the common humanity of the victims of injustice but actually destroys the humanity of the perpetrators of injustice.

Hannah Arendt is right in her *Origins of Totalitarianism* (Harcourt Brace, 1951) when she asserts that the abstract "rights of man" are powerless. They were proved to be so in the concentration camps of the Nazi period, in which the poor victims perished because there was no historic community present which would acknowledge these rights. Yet there is validity in the concept of the "rights of man." It has the validity of the obligation which all men owe each other as human beings. If a community sets up standards in which this obligation is not acknowledged it seems to be unable to set limits for its cruelties and ends with the most awful inhumanities.

The South African situation teaches us that it really makes no difference whether these inhumanities are conceived and practiced by explicit pagans or whether they are generated by the pious Calvinistic farmers of South Africa by compounding Christian piety with racial arrogance and fear. The fact that such a piety could generate such cruelty ought to make all Christians more circumspect in attributing all evils to "secularism." South Africa is merely another reminder of a fact which we should have known from history, namely, that the Christian faith has been, and will continue to become the vehicle of every corruption. "Therefore let any one who thinks that he stands take heed lest he fall."

To return for a moment to South Africa: Communism is not supposed to be the menace to that continent that it is in Asia. But The Reverend James Robinson (*Tomorrow Is Today*, Christian Education Press, Philadelphia, 1954) brings some interesting evi-

dence of the way racial injustice generates communism in Africa quite spontaneously and without too much propaganda. The injustices in South Africa may well be the agent for igniting a flame which may engulf the whole of Africa, including those portions in which heroic efforts are being made to establish some kind of justice in the field of inter-racial relations. In relations between a cultured people and a backward people whose backwardness cannot hide for a moment the equal potentiality of a common humanity, it is not easy to establish justice. The immediate differences in capacity cannot be ignored. But the equal potentialities must also not be ignored. Therefore, justice means essentially that the hope of the future be not cut off. When that hope is destroyed, every present injustice becomes insufferable to the victims and destroys the humanity of the perpetrators because they are forced to indulge in every kind of self-deception to justify their cruelty to their own conscience. In that process of self-deception conventional religion is unfortunately a useful tool.

R. N.

The CIO-AFL Merger and the Labor Movement

The recent merger of the two great labor organizations (the Congress of Industrial Organizations and the American Federation of Labor) is the end of one chapter in the recent history of our nation which may well be more important than the more publicized and noted political chapters. It is important because the growth of a powerful labor movement did more to prevent American capitalism from becoming stagnant and self-defeating, as in France, than any purely political development.

It was only one and one-half decades ago that the rights to organize and to bargain collectively were not generally recognized or at least unchallenged democratic rights. Then came the "New Deal." Among its greatest accomplishments was the encouragement of the labor unions. But the old AFL was unable to organize the work-

ers which needed collective bargaining most. The AFL was composed of craft unions, and the unorganized workers were the semi-skilled workers of the growing mass production industries: automobiles and appliances. The proper instrument for them was the industrial union, a unit comprising the labor force of an entire industry. In 1926 the AFL threatened to organize the auto industry and the automobile kings were properly but needlessly alarmed. The craft unions were incapable of achieving their goal.

Though it is but recent history, it may have been forgotten that the man who fashioned the instrument for the organization of semi-skilled workers was none other than the hated John L. Lewis. The fact that a man with such a monumental ego could perform a creative task in society proves how mixed are the creative and destructive elements in human life and history and how very strange instruments serve the providential ordering of a free society. Incidentally, the Lewis egotism was too consistent to serve the new organization consistently. His lieutenant Phillip Murray, finally succeeded him and was the head of the CIO until his recent death. It is also worth remembering that Lewis, who is politically right of center, was not scrupulous, as he never is, in choosing his organizers. The communists were always on hand ready to infiltrate the labor movement; and Lewis made use of them. The result was that they grasped the levers of power in many unions. It required a decade for the CIO to rid itself of communism in its unions.

But these flaws in the growth of a movement do not alter the fact that the new industrial unions were absolutely necessary instruments for giving labor in general, and especially the labor of the mass-production industries, the necessary power required to redress the disbalances in our economic life and to prevent the new industries from destroying themselves and the economy by establishing high production without a corresponding distribution of the wealth which

the new machines produced. Without that distribution the mass market for the products could not have been maintained. Nowadays these same industries sign contracts for long periods with escalator clauses allowing for rise and decline of wages according to the price index but also providing for automatic yearly increases based upon increased production per worker. This wisdom would have been beyond the competence of any industrial overlord. It is a wisdom which could only have emerged out of the balancing of social forces in a free society.

The merger of the two organizations is not an unmixed blessing. In the industrial field it will eliminate jurisdictional disputes and inter-union "raiding." However, on the political scene, it may be too powerful and monolithic a structure to contribute to the equilibria of democracy. At any rate it reminds us that the problem of modern democracy is in the size of its units of competition. Big unions are necessary to balance "big business." It is better to have this balance than an unbalanced power on one side or the other. But the bigness of the claimants in the democratic arena furnishes us with some new problems.

R. N.

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Conversation: On the International Affairs Report¹ from the Evanston Assembly of the World Council of Churches

I. REINHOLD NIEBUHR

The critics of the World Council's pronouncement on world order have been answered with the assertion that the document has many advantages over previous ecumenical pronouncements on international affairs. One particular advantage is alleged to be its resolution of the perennial debate between the pacifist and non-pacifist wings of the church which necessitated the formula, "some of us believe . . . while others of us hold." This formula, incidentally, never fully revealed that the pacifist "some of us" was a very small minority in the church.

I should think that the basic weakness of the document consists in the manner in which this debate has been resolved. This was done by the simple expedient of presenting the pacifist version of political reality as the ideal possibility and then admitting that it was only an ideal possibility so that Christians are obligated to work for international justice in terms of policies which are declared to be only "frail expedients" in comparison with the ideal possibilities. This formula gives an air of unreality and irrelevance to the whole document.

Thus we are told that, "The Assembly believes that an international order conformed to the will of God and established in his peace can be achieved only through the reconciliation which Christ makes possible. Only thus will those transformed attitudes and standards, agreements and practices which insure lasting peace become possible."

This formula obviously confuses the "peace of God" with the uneasy peace of the world and holds out a perfectionist solution of our perplexing international issues which seems particularly irrelevant in an age of a contest with a terrible despotism and the prospects of atomic destruction.

Having thus genuflected before the perfectionist answer to our problems the message goes on to lay upon Christians the task of establishing a tolerable peace and justice through policies which are declared to be but "frail expedients" in comparison with the ultimate solution. The message does not say that the whole political history of man, whether in international or national politics, is composed of these frail expedients. The resulting unreality of this formula seems to infect the whole document when it considers these various frail expedients.

No doubt the chief virtue of the message is that it comes out resolutely for coexistence, though it is difficult to see how an ecumenical document could have arrived at any other conclusion. But the prescriptions for coexistence are consistently irrelevant.

The message declares that: "An international order of truth and peace would require:

"1. Under effective international inspection and control and in such a way that no state would have cause to fear that its security was endangered, the elimination and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen, and all other weapons of mass destruction, as well as the reduction of all armaments to a minimum.

"2. The development and acceptance of methods of peaceful change to rectify existing injustices."

The message gives a strange cognizance

1. Available in the booklet entitled *Evanston Speaks* for \$.50 per copy from the World Council of Churches, 156 Fifth Avenue, New York 10, New York.

of the fateful fact that agreement on atomic weapons is precisely what the nations have been unable to achieve since the war. It offers some more advice in the light of this situation. It continues: "We first call upon the nations to pledge that they will refrain from the threat or the use of hydrogen, atomic, and all other weapons of mass destruction, as well as any other means of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."

Since all weapons are ultimately included in this prospective pledge it is not clear what is intended by it. Certainly the communists never threaten the independence of a state by military force. The pledge certainly offers no wisdom or guidance in the present Formosan situation in which both sides claim to be defending territorial integrity.

The message defines the minimal requirements of "living together" in the following way:

"1. A conviction that it is possible for nations and peoples to live together, at least for a considerable period of years.

"2. A willingness not to use force as an instrument of policy beyond the existing frontiers. This would not mean the recognition and freezing of present injustices and the unnatural divisions of nations but it would mean renouncing coercion as a means of securing or redressing them." It is not stated how the nations are to be persuaded to this self-abnegation.

"3. A vigorous effort to end social and other injustices which might lead to civil, and hence international, war." This demand has a vague relevance to the problems of the Asian and African world.

"4. A scrupulous respect for the pledged word." This demand is quite irrelevant when we are dealing with a foe who has broken every pledged word and is not likely to mend his ways on a plea from the churches.

"5. A continuing effort to reach agreement on outstanding issues, such as the peace treaties and disarmament, which are essential to a broader stabilization and pacification of relations." No doubt we ought

to continue the efforts but there ought to be some recognition in the message of the desperate difficulty in reaching agreements on even minimal issues.

"6. Readiness to submit all unresolved questions of conflict to an impartial international organization and to carry out its decisions." This demand either misinterprets the United Nations as an impartial tribunal which arbitrates disputes or it assumes the creation of a judicial system which will adjudicate international conflicts. In either case it is not relevant, for there are no current disputes between the two power blocs which could conceivably yield to arbitration or adjudication. They might yield to persistent bargaining.

The message also has some things to say about the declaration of human rights and it calls upon Christians to help create the ethos in which international peace can be established. These demands and accomplishments are only faintly related to the actual situation in which we stand. We are in a contest with a world-wide secular religio-political system with which it is impossible to establish even a minimal common ethos except the common fear of atomic destruction and in which even agreements about human rights are bound to be abstract, if at all possible.

The message might have said some relevant words of Christian judgment to the powerful nations in the democratic camp, particularly to our own nation. That would have had more meaning than all of these highly moral demands to keep the pledged word, and to refrain from aggression. The message simply does not speak to our condition. It is certainly inferior to the message of our own National Council of Churches' study conference (Cleveland, 1953) on international affairs.²

2. This message is available in the booklet entitled *Christian Faith and International Responsibility* for \$.30 each from Department of Publication and Distribution, National Council of Churches, 120 East 23rd Street, New York 10, New York.

II. RICHARD M. FAGLEY

The Evanston Report on International Affairs speaks for itself and certainly does not need my poor power to defend it, especially in view of the response it received at the Assembly and since. While it is surprising to find Professor Niebuhr, whose insights contributed indirectly and even directly to this new formulation of ecumenical consensus, among the heterogeneous handful of critics (Carl McIntyre, pacifist Henri Roser, and Ernest Lefever are the others called to my attention), I recognize that the brevity of the Report opens the door to misunderstanding. If some knowledge of its history can help to clear up misimpressions, I am glad to respond.

The Section IV Report can best be understood, I think, in terms of the purpose sought. That purpose was to focus attention on certain important "concerns on which the common judgment of Christians should be exercised, with a view to our corporate and individual action in world affairs." It tried to provide some guide lines for responsible ecumenical thought and action in the period immediately ahead. It was not addressed primarily to statesmen, although one of them at Evanston urged its wide circulation among his fellows, and many have found it helpful. It was not an effort to "resolve" the debate between pacifists and non-pacifists, but it stressed areas where Christians with differing views could work together. It did not deal with many specific problems which are the day-to-day concern of the C.C.I.A. (Commission of the Churches on International Affairs) and related agencies, but it provided a framework for a vigorous and constructive ecumenical approach to such problems.

Six areas of concern were selected for consideration. The Report starts with the new dimension of insecurity symbolized by the hydrogen bomb, considers other aspects of the problem of tolerable Soviet-Western relations, deals briefly with the equally complex issue of relations between the more developed countries and those less developed, provides a brief estimate of the U.N.

and the problem of future growth, tries to put the concern for international safeguards for human rights in a broader framework, and concludes with an attempt to give more content to the concept of an international ethos stressed at Oxford and Amsterdam. Part of the strength of the Report lies in its over-all balance.

Professor Niebuhr's specific criticisms are directed against four paragraphs of the first two sections: pars. 13, 15, 20 and 26. Consequently, I will try to provide a little background on these particular passages, with little reference to the other 50-odd paragraphs.

Par. 13, which Professor Niebuhr abstracts from its context and calls an "irrelevant prescription for coexistence," is actually part of a chain of propositions regarding the atomic impasse. The preceding paragraph stresses Christian duty in regard to removing causes of war, pressing for restraints on the use of weapons, and urging a patient and persistent search for steps toward disarmament. Then in par. 13 the Section endorsed the disarmament formula supported by the majority of U.N. members ("under effective international inspection and control") and coupled with it a second objective: "the development and acceptance of methods for peaceful change to rectify existing injustices." The combination of the two goals is one of the creative aspects of the Report. These valid objectives were reaffirmed, not because the difficulties were ignored, but precisely because the goals need to be held firmly by those who do not flag in the face of difficulties.

The atomic impasse, and the distrust behind it, are the subject of the following paragraph. The Section then proceeded to propose a number of constructive steps which might be taken. The context of par. 13 is important.

Professor Niebuhr's second target is the first of these proposals, in par. 15, designed as one of several possible starting points for easing the distrust, and thus the impasse. The proposed pledge, the intention of

which he finds "not clear," merely translates the pledge of non-aggression in the U.N. Charter into terms suitable for the atomic age. By shifting the focus from atomic weapons to aggression, such a pledge could at least put propaganda about "out-lawing the bomb" in a truer perspective, and at best might serve as a first step towards wider agreements. The practical significance of the proposal is seen in the fact that its substance was suggested by a C.C.I.A. officer in April, 1954, and put forward by the French and United Kingdom delegations at the Disarmament Conference in June, 1954. Although the U.S.S.R. rejected the French-U.K. proposals in June, at the U.N. General Assembly last fall, the U.S.S.R. proposed a convention on the basis of the French-U.K. proposals. While this pledge was one of the minor steps suggested at Evanston, it does not merit scornful treatment.

Professor Niebuhr's major thrust is directed against par. 20, which introduces the section on "Living Together in a Divided World." This introductory paragraph cites the ultimate goal of "an international order conformed to the will of God" which depends on "the reconciliation which Christ makes possible." Reference to this ultimate goal serves to underscore the importance of work for the reconciliation of men to God and therefore to each other, to indicate one ground for rejecting a fatalistic attitude towards war, and to make clear the distinction between reconciliation and coexistence.

Yet Professor Niebuhr sees in this reference a "pacifist version of political reality" and a "perfectionist solution of our perplexing international issues," which somehow vitiates the "frail expedients" with which the Section was concerned, and gives an "air of unreality and irrelevance to the whole document." The two sentences in question (and they are the main reference to an "ideal possibility" in the Report) seems a mighty slender peg on which to hang such heavy charges. The non-pacifists who drafted these sentences would ask: Since when has the concept of reconciliation become the monopoly of one group in the Church?

It is true that the proximate goals and

solutions which form the main burden of the Report are called "frail expedients," but it is asserted at the same time that in the world as it is the preservation of these frail expedients is "morally imperative as a minimum condition of international order." I should think Professor Niebuhr would be the last to object to measures at the political level being described as "frail expedients." Does he now want the compromises and partial solutions of world politics clothed in brighter garments? Are they not fragile? Are they not morally mixed? Does the fact that they compose the "whole political history of man" make them any less so? The important thing is that the Section, without garbing them in illusions, still recognized the moral imperative posed by these frail expedients.

Finally, Professor Niebuhr criticizes five of the six conditions of a tolerable coexistence advanced in par. 26. These six points were envisaged as objectives which Christians should stress, if a more durable and morally acceptable relationship between the Soviet and non-Soviet societies is to be achieved. The "common fear of atomic destruction" was recognized as an important factor, but it was not regarded as a sufficient base for a tolerable coexistence.

The renunciation of force as an instrument of policy beyond the existing frontiers (#2) assumes a certain stabilization of relations, a *de facto* demarkation of frontiers between the Soviet and non-Soviet worlds. Formosa is the most obvious gap in this process. This point merely recognizes that a repetition of an overt effort to change the frontiers by force, as in Korea, would carry enormous risk of general war. The threat of atomic destruction is the particular reason for this point, as well as its main sanction.

The following point (#3) regarding social and other injustices is closely linked with this. For if the claims of order, particularly in the border regions, are to be validated, it is clear that processes of peaceful change must be activated. Otherwise the pressures generated by injustice will erupt into civil conflict, and if such occurs near the frontiers, the danger of global involve-

ment would be great. This point was not intended as a panacea for Asia and Africa, whose problems are considered in the following section, but as a principle for living together in a divided world.

Professor Niebuhr holds "a scrupulous respect for the pledged word" (#4) to be "quite irrelevant" because of the Soviet record. Yet it is precisely because the coinage of international diplomacy has been debased by broken agreements that it is important for the ecumenical movement to uphold the principle. The corrosion of elementary confidence caused by broken agreements does not invalidate the principle; it merely underlines its importance. Certainly a renewal of respect for the pledged word is essential to a broader stabilization of relations.

In regard to #5, Professor Niebuhr correctly puts the emphasis on "a continuing effort" to reach agreements, for in view of the obstacles, the continuing effort is what was uppermost in the mind of the Section. Perhaps there should have been more expression of the "desperate difficulty" but at least there was "some" recognition of it: as, the "suspicions and distrust" behind the atomic impasse (par. 14), the deep conflict of ideologies (pars. 23-25), the "deadlocks of the cold war" which have often frustrated effective action in the U.N. (par. 37), the lack of "any common set of guiding principles" at the "root of the most stubborn conflicts" (par. 49).

The final point on international settlement (#6) was added to supplement #5 on direct negotiations. Again, the emphasis was on the "readiness to submit," but this time Professor Niebuhr focuses on the term,

"impartial international organization." The Section neither viewed the U.N. as an impartial tribunal nor envisaged some new judicial system. It was the principle of reference rather than the international mechanism which was the center of attention. It might be added, however, that the U.N., while not an impartial tribunal, is nevertheless capable of establishing mechanisms impartial enough to serve the purpose. The Bernadotte-Bunche mission in Palestine, the Graham mission concerning Kashmir, the five-nation team on prisoners-of-war in Korea might be cited. The point is that international mechanisms sufficiently impartial could be found or created, if there were any readiness to submit disputes to third-party settlement.

From certain phrases of his critique, it seems clear that Professor Niebuhr is understandably preoccupied with the problems of U.S. foreign policy. He apparently would have liked the Evanston Report to echo the Cleveland Conference Message. If the latter had been less adequate, his case would be stronger. At any rate, Section IV chose a larger canvas and I believe rightly so. Having personally had the same relationship to the two documents at the preparatory stage, I would judge that Section IV had succeeded at least as well in its more complicated task as the Cleveland Conference—except, it appears, in regard to communicating to some people. It is doubly unfortunate that Professor Niebuhr was unable to take part in Section IV, for the document would have been more incisive, and probably he, rather than I, would be writing this response.

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Christianity and Law: The Fifth Amendment Controversy and the Vindication of the Law

WILLIAM STRINGFELLOW

The change in Congressional majorities wrought by the 1954 election provides an interlude in the Fifth Amendment controversy in which to examine the assault upon the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination and the attempts to defend it. For Christians, the effort to vindicate the privilege bears as disconcerting implications as the assault upon it.

An Ancient Privilege

The privilege against testimonial compulsion was born in controversy. It can be traced to the twelfth century contentions between bishops and king, where the king found it a useful weapon for limiting the examination of people by ecclesiastical authorities. In later centuries the maxim "no one should be required to accuse himself" became important in the abolition of torture as a means of extracting confessions. There is, thus, a close relationship between the establishment of the privilege and the elimination of torture, though the connection arose more from the manifest unreliability of testimony so procured than from a concern for human dignity.

By the time of the colonization of America, the privilege against self-incrimination had roots in the common law and, thereby, was acknowledged in the colonies. Subsequently it was included in the constitutions of several states and was recognized in the courts of all of them. In its present form as part of the Fifth Amendment the privilege was adopted in 1791.

The privilege has yielded not only its purpose of safeguarding the reliability of testimony by protecting against torture, but has come also to embody an abhorrence to torture as violence to personality. Thus, the Supreme Court said in *Twining v. New Jersey* in 1908 that the privilege guards

"against heedless, unfounded, or tyrannical prosecutions," and, moreover, its scope is "a protection to the innocent, though a shelter to the guilty." As such the privilege is closely linked in American law with the presumption that a man is innocent until proved guilty.

The Assault on the Privilege

There have been many assaults on the privilege, perhaps some more serious than that which has taken place in Congressional inquiries, but probably none has so caught public attention as the encounter of Congressional Inquisitor *v.* Fifth Amendment Witness.¹

The encounter must be examined in light of the history and purposes of the privilege, but, moreover, it is essential to summon recollections of the apprehension and tumult in which citizens heard and read of "honeycombed" subversion in industry and education, of security risks and dupes in military installation and laboratory, of party-liners in pulpits and "interlocking" subversion in government departments and imputation of treason in the Democratic Party in twenty years of power.

In retrospect the notion has plausibility that the McCarthy-Jenner-Velde syndicate had no specific original intention to assail the privilege as a legal institution or discredit it in public esteem. The onset against the privilege was but part of a wider, more complex phenomenon.² Perhaps the assault originated in the necessities of bluff and improvisation.

1. Contempt for the privilege has become a noticeable part of the script of TV and motion picture police characterizations, for example, in the movie version of *Dragnet* released in mid-1954.
2. On the other hand *McCarthy and the Communists* by James Rorty and Moshe Dector minimizes too severely the attack on the privilege.

In any case, the scope of these comments is not the mccarthyist phenomenon, except insofar as it has been the *locus* of the attack upon the privilege. Nor is much said here about legislative power to investigate, except to indicate the assault on the privilege as an assertion of unlimited Congressional investigative power. Though earlier it was narrowly confined, by 1929 the only significant limitation upon this power was that it "must be exerted with due regard for the right of witnesses."³ The challenge to the privilege directly contested that limitation.

Let it be clear, too, that in what follows no assumption is made that those who invoked the privilege were innocent of accusations made against them. Rather the assumption is that some were guilty and some innocent. The concern here is with abuse in legislative inquiries of a privilege which, if validly claimed, protects both guilty and innocent.

1. *Inverted Investigations*: An extraordinary aspect of the McCarthy-Jenner-Velde hearings in which the privilege was challenged is that the investigative process was essentially inverted. These were no fact-finding inquiries affording basis for legislative policy-making. Instead the findings were first pronounced, the judgment rendered: for example, in *opening* his investigation on Fort Monmouth in October 1953, Senator McCarthy found that it bore "the earmarks of extremely dangerous espionage."⁴ Thereafter, witnesses were summoned, generally selected to specify the findings to which the legislative committee was already bound.⁵ Such inversion is significant as a departure from the historic function of legislative investigation and for its somber analogies in totalitarian adjudi-

cations. Furthermore, the inversion necessarily imposes an enormous pressure upon the Congressional investigator to produce witnesses to confess findings theretofore announced, because if a confession is forthcoming the findings are not apt to be challenged.⁶ Under such pressure, the inquisitor is sorely tempted to turn to intimidation—even to a degree which becomes torture—to secure a confession.

2. *Inquisitional Methods*: Weapons were wrought to frighten or pressure witnesses in the hearings: the right to counsel was circumscribed, the witness generally knew neither the scope of the inquiry to which he was summoned, nor who his accusers might be, he was usually subjected to testifying in an atmosphere of public spectacle under kleig lights and grinding cameras.⁷ To be summoned at all, unless as a self-styled former Communist or professional informer, surely would subject a witness to suspicion and scorn, often jeopardize his present job and cloud his future employment prospects. The interplay of such factors in the proceedings, manipulated by the inquisitor, made intimidation possible. But, moreover, intimidation could be practiced openly, before the televue of millions of eyes, because it both exposed a witness and punished him. The primary appeal made by McCarthy himself in justifying methods was to a desire for revenge upon the Communist. Some criminologists argue that capital punishment cannot be abolished because, in the case of the abominable sex murder, for example, the public demands revenge—a demand more satisfied by the death penalty than by long imprisonment. Something of the same appeal was made by the McCarthy methods.

3. *The Inference of Guilt*: The Fifth Amendment afforded a shield to intimidation, thereby cheating the inquisitors of the fulfillment of what they called their duty

3. *Sinclair v. United States*, 279 U.S. 263 (1929).

4. The army inquiry of Monmouth began in August 1953; the first employee thereafter suspended for security charges came August 19.

5. Selection techniques varied: Jenner was perhaps the most systematic, usually screening witnesses and summoning only "uncooperative" witnesses to public hearings. In the Monmouth hearings, McCarthy resorted to closed sessions, periodically issued selections and summaries of testimony to the press.

6. Query how far other Congressional committees have "inverted" the investigative process and been subject to a similar pressure. The Kefauver inquiry bears scrutiny in this regard.

7. Cf., Griswold, *Fifth Amendment Today*, pp. 38-49, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1955.

to expose and punish. Hence the attack upon the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination concentrated upon attaching to claim of the privilege the inference of guilt. One way to do so was to terminate the witness' testimony as soon as he invoked the privilege, usually with sufficient commentary to supply the guilty inference. Often witnesses, invoking the privilege, sought to make statements of their grounds for doing so, to which a typical response was, "You will answer whether you are a member of the Communist Party; if you refuse to answer, we will hear no statement from you."⁸ Sometimes, the inquisitor would be more blunt:

Senator McCARTHY: . . . The only condition under which you can invoke that privilege is that if you are a member . . . when you say, "I will not tell whether I am a Communist because if I told the truth, it would incriminate me," that is the same as serving notice that you are a member of the party.⁹

Mark how the privilege, as paraphrased by the Senator, carries within it the necessary inference of guilt. Examples could be profusely multiplied:

Senator SMITH: . . . there are teachers in America, good teachers, patriotic teachers, loyal teachers, who are not members of the Communist Party. Have you ever heard a loyal teacher refuse to answer whether or not he was a Communist when asked such a question under oath?¹⁰

A colleague of Senator Smith on the Jenner Committee pressed the guilty inference this way:

Senator WELKER: Just a moment. Do you think that any member of this committee would hesitate for one second to answer your question if you

would ask us, "Senator, are you a member of the Communist Party or have you ever been?"¹¹

Insofar as the guilty inference was made whenever the Fifth Amendment privilege was claimed, the advance findings of the hearings were publicly vindicated as effectively as when a confession was procured.

It appears that the guilty inference was widely accepted; at least there was acquiescence to it. *The New York Times* reported on March 31, 1953, for example, the statement of the Association of American Universities:

. . . invocation of the fifth amendment places upon a professor a heavy burden of proof of his fitness to hold a teaching position and lays upon his university an obligation to re-examine his qualifications for membership in its society.

Soon the guilty inference was capsuled in a handy epithet: "Fifth Amendment Communist" especially for use in speeches and press statements apart from the hearings themselves, and some lawyers who were otherwise critical of the proceedings advised that claiming the privilege was futile:

Granted that no legal implication may properly be drawn in any *judicial* proceeding from the refusal to answer, who can today misunderstand the consequences which will flow from this action? . . . such a witness . . . helps to give substance to the suggestion that by his silence he is covering up valuable evidence which might have a direct bearing on our national security . . . (italics mine)¹²

The impact of the assault lingers, and even within the past month the President of the American Bar Association has called for debarment of lawyers who invoke the privilege, and a test proceeding has begun in Florida. What more could the inquisitors have hoped for in seeking to associate a guilty inference to any who claim the privi-

8. *Hearings*, Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, Part 6, May 6 and 14; 1953; p. 387.

9. *Hearings*, Subcommittee on Investigations, Part 7, July 1, 2, and 7; 1953; p. 434.

10. *Hearings*, Subcommittee to Investigate Administration of the Internal Security Act, Committee on the Judiciary, Part 2, February 10, 24, and March 3; 1953; p. 421.

11. *loc. cit.*, p. 432.

12. Linowitz, "The Obligation Not to Remain Silent," *American Bar Association Journal*, July, 1954, reprinted in *Case & Comment*, November-December, 1954, p. 29.

lege against testimonial compulsion?

In Defense of the Privilege

Heretofore it has been suggested that the assault upon the privilege took place within a wider mccarthyist phenomenon. So, too, opposition to mccarthyism had many fronts. Indeed, apart from defenses attempted by witnesses who themselves invoked the privilege, remarkably few fought on this front in explicit defense of the privilege. The courts curbed the assault significantly by acquitting almost every person cited for contempt for claiming the privilege in legislative hearings, and contempt citations became less frequent. The American Civil Liberties Union, with skill and relevance, defended the privilege in federal and state litigation and in attempts to inform the community of the history and significance of the privilege. In rarer instances, citizens were aroused enough to express themselves, as, when the Jenner committee held one man hearings in Boston on May 7, 1953, fourteen citizens—including, as the Boston Herald described them, "several eminent and responsible persons"—published a statement explaining why witnesses had been invoking the privilege, and insisting that "refusal to answer . . . does not imply guilt."¹³

By the time the assault reached its climax, in February, 1954, however, with Senator McCarthy calling Zwicker a "Fifth Amendment General" to impute his unfitness, a notable address was made by Dean Erwin Griswold of the Harvard Law School before the Massachusetts Bar Association. Griswold struck squarely at the heart (jugal vein?) of the assault—at the attempt in Congressional inquiries to pin the guilty label on any witness who invoked the privi-

In the months that followed, as the immediate controversy over the privilege has quieted, those concerned to defend and explain the privilege have sought to articu-

late a deeper vindication of it. Thus in October 1954, speaking before the New Jersey Institute of Practicing Lawyers, Dean Griswold reflected:

I believe the Fifth Amendment is, and has been through this period of crisis, an expression of the moral striving of the community. It has been a reflection of our common conscience . . . a symbol . . . of our sense of the essential importance and dignity of the individual.

Such a vindication of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination presses only a further question: the vindication of the conception of individual dignity itself.¹⁵ Dean Griswold alludes to this problem in his New Jersey address when he suggests, ". . . the Fifth Amendment can serve as a constant reminder of the high standards set by the Founding Fathers." Here the appeal is to history as vindicator of the notion of individual dignity reflected concretely in legal institutions like the privilege against testimonial compulsion.¹⁶

It cannot be overlooked that this rationalization of the privilege finds company nowadays in the most outlandish places. To be sure, some who claim that the law is vindicated in the assertion of individual dignity and the striving of men to fulfill the assertion would or do not apply their proposition to the privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, there may be argument about what is involved in the law so vindicated, but the point is only that, in spite of such argument, those who hold this proposition are in company with one another in their view of what the law is and what it ought to be, in *esse*.

But this attempt to vindicate the law

13. To the best of my knowledge, three of the fourteen are members of Christian Action.

14. This and two other addresses of Dean Griswold make up the recently published book, *Fifth Amendment Today*; Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts; 1955.

15. Another question is also raised, that is, of the relationship among different legal institutions all of which are so vindicated. For example, police power can be rationalized in terms of individual dignity; what is its relationship to the privilege?

16. In the *Twining* case, the majority of the Supreme Court suggest that there is a hierarchy of standards and that the privilege does *not* rate "as an immutable principle of justice which is the inalienable possession of every citizen of a free government."

ends in a circular affirmation: the law is vindicated by individual dignity which in turn is vindicated by history, that is, by what men themselves have contrived as systematics and institutions and values. Standing alone, this is an affirmation by men of themselves, mediately or immediately. In the end, by this view, law becomes an assertion of self-justification.

Perhaps some have been uneasy with historical vindication. At least they have fortified it with a further appeal: to God. "Without God," President Eisenhower mentioned on February 24, "there could be no American form of government, nor any American way of life." He was, of course, endorsing the American Legion's "Back to God" campaign: "Recognition of the Supreme Being is the first, the basic, expression of Americanism. Thus the Founding Fathers saw it, and thus, with God's help, it will continue to be."

Others recast the assertion in terms which move closer to a natural law theory. Commented the Hearst papers, editorially, on the Legion campaign:

The people who gave the most to preserve a nation dedicated to the recognition of the *Divine origin of our most cherished American rights and privileges*, are the first to defend it now in the light of that same faith. (Italics mine)

No doctrine of justification by faith is involved here in the recognition of God: rather God is one who applauds men's attempt to self-justify, indeed, the word "God" becomes a synonym for self-justification.

On a Christian View of Law

It is now clear why the suggestion was earlier made that the defense made of the privilege against testimonial compulsion bears as disconcerting implications for Christians as the assault upon it. For in seeking a vindication of the privilege the question is really raised of the vindication of the law, not just one article of the law. The direction in which that rationalization is now sought is the notion of individual dignity which, even though further ration-

alized by an appeal to history, even though cast in religious propositions, amounts to an assertion of self-justification.

What then do Christians say of the law? How may the law be vindicated in Christian faith?

My view is that the law is *not* vindicated in Christian faith.

My view is that Christians speak of human law as originating in sin; law originates in men's hate of God, not their love of Him; it is a way in which they seek to restore life in the creation they have ruined and thereby denies that restoration is in Him; it is an instrument of self-justification.

Yet there is this characteristic about law: even though it is itself of sin, it can name sin. Thus, the law names murder, and in so doing it names sin. Yet this but designates an act as sin, it does not disclose the dimension—the reality of the state of sin into which men fall. To put it otherwise, the law may recognize some act as evil, and it can punish those who so act, yet it is powerless to overcome evil, or the source of evil in the fall, for the law itself has the same origin.

Christians look upon the law in paradox, acknowledging law's condemnation of sin, yet discerning the law's own origination in sin. And this dual view issues in an inquiry implied above. The Christian knows that the striving of men through the law is for justice, but sees that the justice men achieve does not save men, is not justification for them. Therefore, the pertinent inquiry about Christianity and Law is of the connection between human justice (or law) and divine justification. To be distinct about it, *this* is the pertinent inquiry, rather than the more frequently indicated one asking of the relationship between human law and divine law. The latter question, raised most systematically among adherents of the natural law theory, but also really raised by the less sophisticated propositions about individual dignity, is, so to speak, a pre-Christian question. For the Christ whom Christians know as the One who justifies sinners through faith is the same

(continued on page 30)

The Christianity and Modern Man Lectures in Washington, D. C.

DAVID DEMAREST LLOYD

It was not quite twenty-five years ago that a college professor of history, in describing the contemporary climate of opinion, could say, without fear of dissent or contention, "Theology, or something that goes under that name, is still kept alive by the faithful, but only by artificial respiration." Indeed, the climate of opinion, at that time, was so dominated by the scientific view of things that the same author could characterize the outlook of modern man in the following terms: "Accepting *the fact* as given, we observe it, experiment with it, verify it, classify it, measure it if possible, and reason about it as little as may be. . . . Our supreme object is to measure and master the world rather than to understand it."¹

One world war, a cold war, and an atomic age later, these words, however apt they may be for certain aspects of higher education, no longer describe the prevailing climate of opinion. Today a hunger to understand the world, to find its meaning, is breaking out of the rigid channels of two or three decades ago, even among those dedicated to the scientific disciplines. The renaissance of theology we are witnessing today is important evidence of the change. Certainly, theology today is not being kept alive by artificial respiration. On the contrary, it is beginning to bid again to become the center of intellectual life.

What has caused this change in the intellectual tide is less our concern at the moment than how to meet it. For it is clear that the hunger for an understanding of the world—and that means, in the deepest sense, for a theological understanding—is not being adequately satisfied. Our universities are still turning out theological illiterates. Even the tradition of the humanities, the handmaiden of such understanding,

seems to be going to the wall in the crush for vocational training. And as our professional disciplines grow more complex and demanding, their devotees absorb less and less of any underlying philosophy. Into this vacuum there is rushing a sort of homesick mass emotion—typified in the Presidentially endorsed "Back to God" movement.

There is need, in short, for theological education—at all levels, of course, but especially at the level of the intellectually mature, the sophisticated, and the trained professional worker. For these are the people, despite all the jokes about eggheads, who carry with them the intellectual treasure of the race. They are the intellectual salt of the earth, and their savor is important not only to their own happiness, but to the future of us all.

An informal venture in religious education at this intellectual level has been conducted in Washington, D.C., for the last eight years. The experience of this venture confirms the widespread need for mature theological education, and the possibility of satisfying it. It also suggests that other groups and organizations, including chapters of Christian Action, might find a useful vocation in meeting the same need in other localities.

This Washington experiment originated out of a series of small informal discussion groups gathered around the magnetic personality of a great religious teacher, Dr. A. T. Mollegen of the Virginia Theological Seminary. These discussion groups, meeting in the evenings at the homes of the members, had hammered out an approach to Christianity for the modern secularly educated mind. The approach was primarily by way of the historical events of the war years, and their profound emotional effect on the glib assumptions of contemporary culture. Having made the approach in this way, members of the discussion groups de-

1. Carl L. Becker, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers*; Yale University Press; 1932; pp. 16-17.

sired to go further into the basic ideas of the Christian faith and their relation to other philosophies, and accordingly drew on other faculty members of the Virginia Seminary and other sympathetic churchmen in the area for lectures and discussion on special topics. In all this informal activity, Dr. Mollegen provided guidance and encouragement.

After two or three years, the laymen who had been most active in these discussion groups began to feel that the teachers and their ideas should be reaching a wider lay public. To ask the professors of the Seminary and others to continue to give so much time and effort without compensation to groups so limited in number seemed an imposition. Furthermore the group members were confident that the enjoyment and benefit they had been deriving could be shared by many hundreds of like-minded persons in the area. Accordingly, in the fall of 1947 the whole activity was reorganized as a series of lecture courses open to the public for a fee, and under lay management. The first course was by Dr. Mollegen, entitled "Christianity and Modern Man," and from that title the whole enterprise took its name, so that it is now known as the "Christianity and Modern Man Lecture Series," or, for short, "C. and M.M."

The lectures have followed certain definite principles from their inception. This is not an ecclesiastical effort to gain proselytes or to rally the faithful. Sponsorship is in lay hands, and the executive group, or "organizing committee," as it is called, does not admit clergymen to its ranks. The lectures are offered to the public as a serious intellectual product at the college graduate level, and those wishing to partake must pay the fees, which are modest and set just high enough to meet expenses (at the rate, usually, of \$10.00 for a 15-lecture course, or \$1.00 per lecture for those who prefer to pay evening by evening rather than in advance for the entire course). The lecturers are compensated at the minimum rate of \$25.00 per lecture, with upward adjustments sometimes when the income permits, and travel expenses for those from out of town. There has been no endowment, no

tapping of distinguished patrons, no subsidy. There is no effort to organize those who come to the lectures, or to follow up on their religious interests. The function of "C. and M.M." is strictly construed as presenting mature religious education on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. With one exception, it has left other forms of religious activity to other groups. Personal religious problems are left alone, except to the extent that they may be brought voluntarily into the discussions following the lectures, or that some auditors may care to take them up privately, afterwards, with the lecturers.

Operating within these prescribed limits, the courses have shown a rising trend of attendance and influence. There were approximately sixty in the audience at the first lecture in 1947. Today the opening lecture each year draws between 200 and 250 auditors. There is an active mailing list of between two and three thousand who receive announcements. New people are constantly being drawn in, as a result either of newspaper publicity and advertising or word of mouth.

The annual pattern is now fairly well fixed: a course of broad general interest with the greatest popular appeal in the fall, from October to January, consisting of ten to fifteen lectures; a shorter course, usually of seven or eight lectures, more specialized in nature, from the first of the year to the beginning of Lent, and a course of four or five lectures, sometimes in the nature of a symposium, between Easter and June first. In all probability this schedule could be elaborated and more courses could be offered successfully if the organizing committee were able to give more time to the project, or delegate its administrative duties.

The subject matter of the courses falls into three general categories. The first category is essentially apologetic, embracing courses which relate Christianity to the major philosophies or to general intellectual currents of the present day. Foremost among these is Dr. Mollegen's basic course, the first in the series, and a recurrent staple, which now goes under the more specific title of "Christianity and The Crisis of Secularism," and ranges from medieval

Christianity through the rise of secularism to the modern predicament, ending with an exposition of Christian revelation and the Christian answer. Other courses in this category have been entitled "The Religious Demand Upon Society, A Study of the Phophetic Tradition," and "Christianity and History" which was a review of Christian doctrine and cultural and philosophical history. Also successful were shorter courses entitled "The Christian Faith," and "Christianity, Its Contemporary Meaning."

The second category consists of courses aimed at one or two major theological problems, or a specific book of the Bible. In this group were courses on the Gospel of John, the Gospel of Mark, "The Holy Spirit and The Christian Life," and a study of the Ecumenical Movement. Most successful in this category was "Jesus—Faith and Fact" by Dr. Clifford L. Stanley. This drew as large an audience as some of the more generalized courses, but it is generally true of courses in this category that they attract smaller and more studious audiences.

The third type of course relates Christianity to a particular contemporary problem or mental discipline. There have been two courses on Christianity and psychoanalysis, one of them a symposium participated in by two of the leading psychiatrists in the Washington area. This topic, by the way, is one of the most popular. There has also been a symposium on Christianity and political realism, a course on Christianity and Communism, and one on the question of formulating a Christian interpretation of American history.

The lecturers have included Dr. Clifford L. Stanley, Professor of Theology at the Virginia Seminary, Dr. Robert O. Kevin, William A. Clebsch, Kenneth Heim and Jesse Trotter, all of the same institution, the Rev. Charles Spinnette, Canon of the Washington Cathedral, and Dr. Charles Lowry, and from New York Drs. Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul Tillich and Eduard Heimmann. Dr. Mollegen, in addition to his almost continuous service as a lecturer, has served as the unofficial "Dean" and scholarly adviser of the group.

From the beginning, the Washington

Cathedral has provided its Library as a lecture hall, at nominal cost. For the more popular courses, space has been arranged in the buildings of the St. Alban's parish on the Cathedral hill, or in the auditorium of one of the Cathedral schools. The convenience of the Cathedral area as a meeting point in the Washington area, and the gracious nature of the surroundings there have kept the organizing committee from scheduling courses in other places. As a result, the enterprise has become known in some quarters as "the Cathedral lectures," but the Cathedral authorities have no official connection with the group. A few years ago, the organizing committee was twice invited by the Cathedral Dean to sponsor and select a theme for four Sunday evening services during Advent, and to nominate and invite the preachers for the occasion, but beyond these two ventures in corporate worship, the Cathedral has played the part only of a friendly and sympathetic host. The organizing committee owes much to the encouragement of the Bishop of Washington and the Cathedral authorities, but has always insisted that the enterprise should avoid a denominational label, and should appeal, so far as possible, to all branches of the faith as well as to the unchurched.

One of the most unexpected outgrowths of the enterprise is its business in mimeographed transcripts of the lectures. Begun purely as an experiment, with the thought that auditors would like to purchase copies of the lectures they might have to miss, the transcripts have become a central and sometimes a dominating feature of the organizing committee's activities. The committee was fortunate enough to have among its closest friends and supporters a couple, members of Christian Action, engaged in the business of transcribing and mimeographing conferences, lectures and related activities. To C. and M.M. they brought their editorial and technical competence, and the ability to turn a verbatim record of the lectures and discussions into a compact and highly readable mimeographed book. Most of the courses are published in

(continued on page 25)

Toward An Ethic of Leisure

VAN A. HARVEY

While the churches appear to have had some moderate success in communicating to large elements of the laity the importance of a doctrine of vocation, the sociologists in our midst have called our attention to the fact that for the last decade or so we might have more profitably spent our time interpreting the leisure sphere. Our culture, according to these sociologists, is no longer oriented to the sphere of production but to the sphere of consumption. The average man no longer is searching for meaningful work since he has begun to find this meaning in his leisure. He takes the relative meaninglessness of his work for granted, and he pursues his leisure with a kind of tight-lipped intensity that reveals the leisure sphere itself to be, paradoxically enough, a kind of work. Leisure activities which used to provide a change of pace and role now became the realm in which this man seeks the images for his interpretation of himself and his relations to those about him.

The sociological pundit who has taken this phenomenon and made out of it just about as much as one man can is David Riesman. Although we may permit the professional sociologists to indulge in a certain amount of condescension toward him now that he has had the misfortune to become tapped by *Time* magazine as its expert on the American character—along with its other experts: Vogelin in politics, Teller in science, Jung in psychology—the Protestant churches can scarcely afford the luxury of contempt. Anyhow, Mr. Riesman is not alone in his analyses. He just happens to wield a more effective pen and is able to make the ink go further—and sometimes, one suspects, thinner—than his more inarticulate colleagues who seem obsessed with a completely scientific and mathematical terminology. C. Wright Mills in his strident but provocative *White Collar* has addressed himself in passing to the same problem.¹ His conclusion, like Riesman's, is that the last two decades have witnessed

a distinct shift in the goals of the American character, a shift which is most strikingly marked by the substitution of an ethic of consumption for an ethic of production.

Leisure activity is no longer an escape for modern man from the pressures of the group. It has become, as a matter of fact, highly standardized and conventionalized. In addition, and perhaps more important, people look increasingly to the leisure sphere for the models and ideals in the light of which they will interpret their lives. Riesman writes that "movies, fiction, and radio for adults increasingly deal with 'here and now' problems: how to handle one's relations with children, with the opposite sex, with office colleagues away from the office. Story writers of the better women's magazines are instructed to deal with the intimate problems faced by the readers . . . there is no 'escape' from leisure."²

What is characteristic of leisure activities in our society is that they are pursued with a seriousness that betrays the fact that it is no longer leisure in the old sense of the word. It is mass leisure; that is, the techniques of mass production have increasingly determined its character and function. The entertainment world has become the most productive source of our cultural myths, our images of self-understanding. And this network of meaning, this mythology, is conditioned by the world of the advertisers who themselves in turn reflect the values of the entertainment media. It is something of a circle; how vicious it is depends on one's system of values.

Mills' work is the attempt—how successful it is I am scarcely in a position to judge—to reveal the sociological and economic roots of this transformation. Basically, it is

1. Mills, C. Wright, *White Collar, The American Middle Classes*; Oxford University Press, N.Y.; 1951.
2. Riesman, David, *Individualism Reconsidered and Other Essays*; Glencoe Free Press, Illinois; 1954; p. 111.

grounded in the rise of the new middle class, the white collar worker. It is a little startling to learn that whereas the white collar workers only composed about fifteen percent of the middle classes in 1870, in 1940 they numbered about fifty-six percent, an increase from three-quarters of a million to about twelve and one-half million. The so-called old middle class rested somewhat uneasily on the remnants of the old Protestant ethic of work. The new middle class is oriented toward an ethic of leisure. The cultural hero of yesterday was the producer, today he is the entertainer. If leisure was once valued in terms of its contribution to the meaning of one's work, one's work is now valued in terms of what it can produce in the way of leisure.

The new importance of the leisure sphere cannot be easily isolated, of course, from the decline in the meaningfulness of work. It might, therefore, be legitimately argued that the churches ought to work even harder at a doctrine of vocation. But however hard the clergy works at it, it will be relatively ineffectual unless it is correlated with a critical interpretation of popular culture, for popular culture goes a long way toward influencing the laymen's interpretation of the church's message itself. It is indeed ironical that the role of the minister should be so largely understood by many laymen not in the categories of the minister's own interpretation of his function but in the categories of popular fiction and the personality cult. How important this phenomenon is was pointed out recently by William Miller in a review of Bishop Fulton Sheen's television program. For even Sheen's charismatic authority is derived less from his "office" than from his "magnetic personality," however heretical this might be in Roman Catholicism.

It will be argued by some that the churches have not been asleep at the switch. Have they not poured thousands of dollars into religious television, not to mention exploiting the new techniques of visual education? Isn't the Christian Gospel reaching more than ever before and, furthermore, confronting modern man in the intimacy of his own living room? If the budget of the

Broadcasting and Film Commission of the National Council of Churches is any indication of the prophetic role of the church then surely Protestantism is riding the crest of the wave.

Actually, there seem to have been at least two types of response by the churches to this new cultural situation. The first has been indicated above. That is to say, there has been a concerted attempt to capture and exploit the media for religious purposes. The second type of response has been apathy coupled either with disdain or much pontificating about "crowd culture," "meaninglessness," "triviality," and the like. Each type of response is inadequate but in its own way revealing.

1. With regard to the attempts to exploit the new techniques of mass communication and entertainments one can only concur with Dean Liston Pope of Yale: one wouldn't have believed that anything could be "stickier" than some of the soap operas, but religion seems to have managed it on radio and television. In his rather controversial address to the Broadcasting and Film Commission of the National Council of Churches on March first of this year, Dr. Pope had the courage to articulate what an intelligent Christian would have to say about most of the programs sponsored by that organization, that they are for the most part pious self-help programs which only utilize the slogans and cliches of the culture they are attempting to transcend, or second-rate dramas which neither have the depth nor the imagination of many of the commercially sponsored shows.

What is particularly distressing is the amount of money that is spent by the great religious denominations on these enterprises in contrast to their budgets for social action and education. One thirty-minute film produced by an unknown independent religious film company costs upwards of fifty-thousand dollars. Anyone who has seen much of what passes for visual aid will yearn for the days of the missionary home on furlough who used to entertain us on Sunday nights with his amateurish travelogues of strange places. At least the investment was modest, the crudity excusable,

and the actors honest. But there is something irresponsible about investing the large sums of money for the bathrobe dramas and happy stories that pass for religious education in our Sunday schools and on television. And as for the dubious practice of televising church programs one can only say with Dr. Pope that this merely offers to the television audience the same type of religious program which it has rejected as irrelevant by staying home, not to mention the fact that it fails to understand the nature of the reality of worship which has its meaning and value in terms of participation and community. It seems almost incredible that the zealous promoters of religious television should fail to understand the inability of certain kinds of communication to express the kind of truth which it is the function of the church to communicate.

2. But if the first type of response is overly zealous and uncritical in its attempt to get in on the ground floor of the mass media, the second type of attitude betrays its fundamental irrelevancy by a kind of disdain for popular or mass culture. Riesman finds this attitude particularly characteristic of the intellectual who wouldn't own a television set even if he could afford one. An interesting question to ask of this group is whether their disdain is in any sense a compensation for the fact that they are unwilling to engage in the relatively difficult task of formulating some legitimate principles of criticism to guide the Christian in relating himself to this phenomenon of a leisure culture.

Is our present "theology for social action," forged as it was in the political and social struggles of the last decade, easily adaptable to the new cultural situation? Is it not true that the social action of the past dealt with more easily identifiable evils than those that Protestantism confronts today. Even in the good old days of the Social Gospel, when divinity students got out on the picket lines, it was very difficult to demonstrate to the average layman the direct line of inference from one's Christian beliefs to one's political judgments. It is even harder to justify, in terms that the average man can understand, one's revulsion at the use of adver-

tising for political campaigns or the exploitation of personal life on television by such programs as "This Is Your Life." Consequently, too many of us take the easy way out, and assume a kind of Olympian disdain for television and the motion pictures, except, of course, the foreign ones. We relegate them all to the limbo of "crowd culture."

As a matter of fact, the difficulty is that in the sphere of popular culture the traditional categories of "tolerable justice," "countervailing power," "responsible decision making" and "the public good" have little obvious meaning except if more broadly and meaningfully interpreted. The old rules-of-thumb that we used to operate upon in the political and social struggles for economic justice, racial equality, and the like seem to have lost their self-evident relevance.

Is it possible that most of our categories are too fundamentally moralistic? That is to say, just as we used to criticize the old type of Orthodoxy for its concern with the more sensational aspects of sin, such as sex and the like, haven't we tended to act largely in terms of the more readily identifiable villains, such as the exploiter of labor, the demagogue and racist, and the plunderer of the public domain? Our social ethics courses as they are taught in colleges by and large deal almost exclusively with the traditional—and still legitimate—problems of race, war, economic life and sex, love, and marriage. It is not that these problems have been solved or that they are no longer important. It is simply that an extremely important area of modern life and culture is ignored because there seem to be no discernable principles of criticism.

As an example one may point to the very modest but relatively important enterprise of commentary and criticism of the motion pictures and television in the religious press. Where, except in one or two notable cases, does one find any intelligent and theologically informed reflection on these two communications media? For the most part there is nothing at all, and if there is a line or two it usually confines itself to a brief synopsis of the plot, a few ill-informed remarks

about the acting, a brief note as to whether there is too much liquor or excessive bouncing about by the heroine, and a vague rating system which divides the universe into adults, families, and not for children. On occasion, a reviewer will call special attention to a "religious picture" such as *The Robe* or *David and Bathsheba* or devote a column in praise of the "great work" of someone like Cecil B. DeMille who, according to a statement by the Social Action Committee of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., brought "Bible stories to more people than any other man," but the church seems hardly aware of the opportunities of sustained and responsible religious interpretation that can develop a kind of critical awareness and selectivity in relation to the mass media. How else is the average layman going to achieve some kind of self-knowledge and transcendence in relation to his culture and his faith? And how else will the churches come to some kind of articulate policy with relation to the problems of popular culture without hammering it out on the anvil of concrete analysis?

Actually, there seems to be a growing concern for the "theology of culture" in the seminaries. The barbarism can be tolerated if it indicates a more inclusive critique of the common consciousness than is usually implied in the more traditional framework of social ethics. But is it not the case that too often this theology of culture seems preoccupied with a symbolic analysis of Culture with a capital "C"—the latest images of Tennessee Williams and Arthur Miller—and quite impatient with relating this thematic content to the institutional and economic structures which undergird and support this content. Productive analysis will relate the myths and the images to the sociological structures and see the sociological structures in turn influencing and determining the nature of the myths. In this way, criticism and social policy might be correlated and mutually inter-related.

The importance of relating one's analysis and criticism of popular culture to the institutional structures by which they are sup-

ported cannot be overemphasized. An inclusive concern for institutions strikes the laymen as irrelevant to the faith, and he harbors the suspicion that the Christian ethicist is secretly more concerned about the two-party system than with exploring the relevance of the Christian Gospel. But purely theological criticism of the content of the mass media, on the other hand, while more obviously "related" to ethical and moral concerns, is less relevant than if it is understood how the motifs and themes are grounded and rooted in an institutional structure which gives them a stability and force they would not otherwise have. The motifs of popular culture are supported firmly by very powerful economic institutions, though doubtless these in turn justify themselves in terms of the very values which these institutions support.

Critical comment on the motion pictures, for example, is most relevant when an attempt is made to relate the content of the films to the underlying institutional determinants which shape and mold that content, such determinants for example as production policy, the star system, the demands on the exhibitor, and the like. Some such understanding would at least serve the negative purpose of forestalling the usually innocuous and misguided attempts of the churches to influence Hollywood, even though it might be too much to hope that it would contribute to a wider understanding of how the Church as an institution could help create a more authentic and vital medium by an enlightened policy which operated with wisdom and imagination.

Actually, is it not the case that most theological seminaries seem relatively unaware of the important relation between theology and polity, let alone trying to understand an analogous relation in the culture at large between ideology and its economic roots? The seminaries will have to understand that the gains of the past decades in theology will be as quickly lost unless these insights find expression in a foundation more deeply rooted than individual faith. It is not that each new divinity student must be turned into a village sage,

as Barth fears, so much as it is a case of understanding that the Word and personal faith are only powerful and relevant when they are related to the culture's dominant sources of self-understanding and, therefore, transcend it, and are grounded in an institution which is structurally able to relate itself to the institutions of that culture.

Christianity and Modern Man

(continued from page 20)

this way, and the sale of these transcripts, at cost, has found a widening public beyond the actual audience and the confines of the Washington area. Over \$10,000 worth of transcripts has been sold and the purchasers are scattered across nearly all the 48 states, Alaska, Japan, Canada, Mexico, and other countries in Latin America. The committee believes that the rather loose and discursive style of these recorded lectures has a greater impact, at least for some readers, than more tightly written and authoritative books in the field of theology.

The C. and M.M. venture, because it has demonstrated the underlying demand for theological education, has stimulated a certain amount of competition and imitation in the Washington area. A similar "mission to the egg-heads" has been observed on the Roman Catholic side, and there have been counterparts in other denominations. This year an effort under lay leadership has been undertaken to restate "liberal Christianity." In addition, some parishes have called upon C. and M.M. lecturers to give courses, on a similar fee basis, for their interested parishioners.

It is entirely possible that the lessons of the C. and M.M. experience may be transferred, at least in part, to other sections of the country. The demand must exist wherever there is an educated public. However good local denominational efforts at meeting it may be, there is bound to be a certain sector of the potential public which

is not reached by denominational or parish appeals.

Another lesson of the Washington experience which probably has universal application is the willingness of people to seek out this form of instruction, and to pay for it. Religious instruction need not be on a charity basis. And it is probably more highly regarded if it conforms to prevailing mores, and puts a dollar value on itself.

But while the demand may be widespread, the means of satisfying it may be hard to duplicate. Washington has the good fortune of being adjacent to a seminary whose faculty is not only fitted for this kind of work, but ready to undertake it, and willing to give it continuous support and counsel. Furthermore, New York is not so far away that the leaders of Union Theological Seminary are unable to take part and give added stimulus. And Washington also has a night-school tradition, which takes evening courses in theology in its stride along with the prevalent and crowded courses in law, accounting and everything else.

Nevertheless it can be suggested that one of the services Christian Action might render is the promotion of this sort of education throughout the country. Wherever a chapter finds in itself a common interest in theological thinking, and a fairly consistent approach to theological problems, it might well consider setting up a similar Laymen's Institute, provided the teachers can be found. A Christian Action chapter has or should have the advantages of being interdenominational and also outside official church organizations. This gives it a head start on reaching thoughtful contemporaries who are unchurched, or dissatisfied with the intellectual life in their own churches, or wary of missions, revivals, and other ecclesiastical come-ons. Each community will have different attitudes and different resources, but a little testing and experimenting in this field may bring astonishing results.

REVIEWS

An Appeal to Americans

Tomorrow Is Today, by James H. Robinson; Christian Education Press, Philadelphia; 1954; 127 pp; \$2.00.

The distinguished pastor of the Church of the Master in Harlem is known far and wide as Jim Robinson. His warmly human qualities went with him when he traveled around the world for the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions. As a result, his trip was like no one else's.

It is not that his conclusions are greatly different from those of other able analysts. It is rather that he talks of East Europe, Africa, and Asia with an intimacy rare in a Westerner. "For the first time in my life," he reports, "my color and my race were assets rather than handicaps." Further, he was willing to accept the penalty of weeks of dysentery for the sake of sharing the food and water and poverty of the people he visited. Out of all this he writes a book of brilliant insight that gives a vivid picture of great sections of the world. It carries a burning appeal to Americans to revise their thinking and policies.

Dr. Robinson's theme is that two revolutions are going on today. To the communist revolution he is flatly opposed. But the nationalist revolution he endorses, for its aim is freedom, self-respect, the conquest of bitter poverty. So he says: "Actually, what the nationals of the great lands of Africa and Asia want is the opposite of communism. Who better than we could help them attain it if we were not confused and afraid? They want nothing more than what we fought and sacrificed to achieve."

Ironically we have been maneuvered into opposing the very things the American heritage has always upheld, while Russia appears in many places to be endorsing the aspirations that actually the Soviet system crushes. For getting out of this trap Robinson offers a series of proposals that range from national policy to the acts and attitudes of private individuals.

Reading Robinson is not as great an experience as hearing him, but it is a good second best. This book packs a lot of power, especially in its revealing anecdotes. It can be useful in the preacher's study, in church study groups, in college classrooms. It can do more than many a thicker volume to crack the composure of people who take their views of the world struggle from the weekly news magazines.

ROGER L. SHINN

* * *

The Irony of Anti-Semitism

Christianity and Anti-Semitism, by Nicolas Berdyaev (with Commentary and Notes by Alan A. Spears); Philosophical Library, New York; 1954; 58 pp.; \$2.75.

The most significant aspect of Berdyaev's approach to anti-semitism is his treatment of it as a Christian rather than a Jewish problem. At the outset, he quotes Leon Bloy to the effect that Christians are always treating the people of Jesus Christ with insults and contempt. Anti-semitism thus becomes one peculiarly maddening aspect of human sin, as manifested within the context of Christianity, one that flouts the meaning of the New Covenant at its Jewish source.

Berdyaev sees anti-semitism as one facet of the Christian problem of social action. As a Christian can rationalize a failure to fight for the achievement of social justice because the final realization of the Kingdom of God is impossible in this world, so too can he rationalize a failure to combat anti-semitism within history because the ultimate solution of the problem is eschatological. For Berdyaev, the final solution would involve the conversion of Jews to Christianity, but he sees this as blocked within history by the sinfulness of Christians.

Berdyaev is keenly aware of the paradoxical character which pervades the exist-

ence of the Jewish people through history and remarks that "Perhaps the saddest thing to admit is that those who rejected the Cross have to carry it while those who welcomed it are often engaged in Crucifying others." (pp. 7f) By treating the question of anti-semitism in its religious dimension, he reveals the shallowness of many politico-economic analyses of "the Jewish problem." It is the virtue of the excellent commentary by Alan A. Spears to emphasize this by placing the essay in the context of recent work on anti-semitism as well as in the context of Berdyaev's thought.

MALCOLM DIAMOND

* * *

An Unusually Rich Journal

Cross Currents; Vol. IV; 1954; \$3.00.

Cross Currents, "a quarterly review to explore the implications of Christianity for our times," is now in its fifth year of publication. I do not know how successful it is as a publishing venture, i.e., how many subscribers it has and whether it has produced a community of readers around itself. But I feel strongly that it should be closely followed by the members of "Christian Action." Edited by Roman Catholic laymen who feel that Christians must exercise an intellectual responsibility by the achievement of a critical and constructive understanding of the major cultural programs of our day, it presents regularly an astonishing panorama of Christian world views. The editors have a keen eye for the unusual. They are well acquainted with those writers in western Christendom who have succeeded in gaining a following because of their efforts to show the relevance of the Christian tradition for contemporary secularist civilization. Moreover, they are well-read in the many Christian intellectual journals all over the world which exercise a more powerful influence upon the thinking of Christian people than many well-established magazines with wide circulations.

Volume IV contains, among others, articles or pieces by Kierkegaard ("What Does It Mean to Doubt?"), Maurice Blondel, Jean Daniélou ("The Ignatian Vision

of the Universe and of Man"), Christopher Dawson ("Sociology as a Science"), Claude-Edmond Magny ("Faulkner's Inverse Theology"), and Max Scheler ("On the Tragic"). Most of these are translated for the first time from the German or the French (and very well translated!)

In the same volume, one can find informing articles on the priest workers of France, and on the whole problem of work and action; on secular humanism; on Christianity and democracy (by J. V. Q. Casserley); and on Byzantine Democracy and the Orthodox Church.

"Cross Currents" is an unusually rich journal. It deserves to be supported. The annual subscription costs only \$3.00 (3111 Broadway, New York 27).

WILHELM PAUCK

* * *

Christianity, Liberalism, and Sherwood Eddy

Eighty Adventurous Years: An Autobiography, by Sherwood Eddy; Harper & Bros., New York; 1955; 255 pp.; \$3.00.

During the three-score years of his incredibly active life, Sherwood Eddy has traveled restlessly over the face of the earth, observing, speaking, listening, probing, writing. He has come to know many of the famous men of his eighty adventurous years, not a few of them intimately. He has given innumerable addresses and written thirty-five books. This, his thirty-sixth, moves swiftly down the stream of years, capsuling the experiences and thought, the actions and reactions of the author.

Reinhold Niebuhr, in the Introduction, speaks of Eddy's "uncomplicated directness"; Eddy himself notes that "whatever I believed at any one time I believed firmly" (p. 103). Without reservation he has given himself to cause after cause, all of them turning around the foci of Christian faith, social liberalism, and world peace. Those who have known Eddy in but one of the facets of his varied career will read with interest this summary of the sweep of his life and thought. Those who share the interest of this journal in the Christian social

movement will find much to interest them. It is widely believed that the liberal, progressivist version of social Christianity known as the "social gospel" declined in the United States sharply after the first World War, though some have suggested that it was not until the 1930's that the decline came. There is strong confirmation for the latter view in this autobiography. It was the shock of the first war that drove Eddy (and many like him) to confront the social problems from the viewpoint of Christian faith. For example, it was after the war that the YMCA (which Eddy served until his "retirement" at age sixty) rather rapidly shifted its emphasis from the evangelical to the social. This thesis, which Howard Hopkins advanced in his big *History of the YMCA in North America*, finds some exact documentation from Eddy's pen. Returning to his "Y" post after war service, Eddy offered his resignation, fearful lest his new concern for social and economic justice would embarrass the Association, but John R. Mott urged he remain and the International Committee did not accept the resignation offer. The orientation of the "Y" changed along with men like Eddy.

Many other aspects of recent social Christian history are commented upon—the forming and then the fairly general breaking of the alliance with pacifism, the use of the smear against social Christian leaders, the cooperative experiment on the Mississippi Delta under the leadership of Sam Franklin. But the social Christian is but one of the concerns illuminated in these pages; in a sense the whole book is a review, and the reviewer of it can but suggest its sweep. There are interesting and informative passages on the crises of many nations ("I saw the Soviet Union pass through three awful purges" [p. 143]). There are pertinent observations about great men ("Niebuhr is rapid and impatient and has seemed to many proud, but I have always found him a humble Christian, a fearless prophet, and a true friend" [pp. 202 f.]). There are honest statements of his religious orientation ("I believe that God has entered human history in Jesus, the Christ, that in this one great deed of God, as a revelatory event, all history is forever centered and divided" [p. 231]). This is a lively and informative report of a colorful and dedicated life.

ROBERT T. HANDY

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Christian Economics

A Christian Economy, by William G. Peck; The Macmillan Company, New York; 1954; 164 pp.; \$3.50.

Written from within the British situation and addressed to its particular problems, this book is, nevertheless, quite relevant beyond the British Isles. Dr. Peck is sure that there is a Christian economics, and he is sure that it implies a radical critique of the Welfare State. But at that point any accidental parallel to our domestic *Christian Economics* fortunately comes to an abrupt end. Dr. Peck's spiritual affinities are with St. Thomas Aquinas rather than with Adam Smith.

A Christian Economy represents the type of Anglican social thought which has grown out of the Christendom Association and the Industrial Christian Fellowship. The presupposition is that it is possible to erect a normative Christian sociology "upon the Christian conception of man and the assumptions of the Gospel" and that the fundamental principles of such a system are to be found in "the conception of an integrated wholeness which was the foundation of the great sociology taught by the Christian doctors in the Middle Ages." Contemporary social and economic problems are the effects of that post-Renaissance attitude "which made the Church lean toward pietism and secularized everything else."

These effects include the separation between the form of money and its substance so that money itself came to be regarded as the supreme economic reality, the acceptance of an essential strife in industry which is projected as the trade war between nations, the breakdown of natural community leading to the formation of the human mass, and "the increasing acceptance of the centralized power-State as the necessary substitute for the broken and vanished natural community." An interesting chapter on the Church's retreat from its earlier position in the face of rising financialism bears the title "Usury in History and Religion."

Considerable space is devoted to a critique of the Welfare State on the grounds that it usurps the functions of natural communi-

ties and that it operates within the context of a situation that is fundamentally wrong. Dr. Peck holds that "the perpetuation of the Welfare State as a permanent solution assumes the perpetuation of the abnormality as a necessary phenomenon," so that within its terms Britain is "compelled to attempt to maintain welfare services by competition in the world-market," which means that she wishes "to go on being rich at the cost of other people's poverty—only to distribute the riches a little more evenly."

This review makes no attempt to deal with the rather detailed economic analysis which forms a great portion of the book, but the conclusion is that the modern world has from the beginning carried the seeds of its own destruction because its basic social and economic principles have been contrary to the natural order—which becomes unnatural and has deleterious physical, cultural, psychological, and spiritual effects when not sacramentally related to its supernatural end.

The longest single chapter, "Communism as the Rival of Christianity," takes the position that Communism is basically a metaphysic of man and "has to be approached primarily from the fundamental position of the Christian doctrine of man." Dr. Peck maintains that "Communism is a gigantic protest of natural man, against the effects of the decline of the Christian theology of the natural. It is the natural man, in his actual environment, unguided by the supernatural illumination of the Christian revelation, blindly seeking to be himself, though no longer knowing the whole of what he is." Although making the "disastrous identification of man with economic man," Communism is the first real attempt to provide the confused activities of economic man with a comprehensive interpretation of the ultimate meaning of life. However, since it arises out of a socio-economic situation and interprets life through economic development, a Christian answer must be given on the level of economic theory. "If we believe that Communist collectivism . . . is a false solution of the economic problem in the modern world, we must produce a better solution." It is partly on the assumption

that there is a valid Christian economics that Dr. Peck is able to say that "modern history is culminating in this tremendous alternative, Marxian Communism or the return of Christendom."

Dr. Peck suggests as Christian political and economic objectives: 1. the creation of a more balanced economy, involving a greatly increased British agriculture "and the revival of the rural community, not only of farm workers, but of industries disseminated in small units, and of small craftsmen and tradesmen;" 2. regionalism and decentralization of governmental power in the interest of "the human values discoverable in small communities;" and 3. "a corporative or Guild structure in industry," involving the ownership of industries by their operators under the supervision of a State appointed authority. With these objectives must go "such a revision of monetary philosophy as will more closely relate the creation and destruction of money to the needs of the community."

However, it is recognized that the more fundamental need is a recovery "in the pre-political, pre-economic sphere" and that the primary task of the Church is an enlightened evangelism which will call men back to that inclusive "God-consciousness" on which the "reinstating of person and community" must rest.

This reviewer's chief criticisms would concern the Thomistic natural law orientation of the book. The idea of the natural order proves, in Dr. Peck's hands, to be a quite effective device for the critical analysis of the flaws in the present economic system. However, when he turns to the constructive task, he fails to be as convincing. He attempts to guard himself against both Utopianism and the idolizing of the Middle Ages. And yet one feels that the dependence of his own suggestions on such medieval socio-economic structures as the

Restraint of Usury, the Just Price, and the Guild System renders some of what he has to say a trifle quaint. When he says of the medieval method of organizing economic life, "This is the Christian social tradition," one feels that he is coming too close to an identification of an economic system contingent on the conditions of another age with the solution of a somewhat different set of problems in the present. One wishes to commend to him the less doctrinaire English social tradition of muddling through.

From a Protestant perspective, one is also entitled to be a bit dubious about the orientation of the final chapter, which bears the title "Are We Indispensable?" The eyebrow is to be raised when it is discovered that the "we" refers to the clergy and that the answer is affirmative. Nevertheless, it contains a valuable plea for the Church's acceptance of social responsibility and a suggestive sociological interpretation of the dictum: *Extra ecclesiam, nulla salus*. Dr. Peck's book is well worth reading for the sake of its criticism of the present socio-economic order, its exposition of the Christian social imperative, and as the expression of a particular type of approach to the problems of social policy.

ARNOLD W. HEARN

Christianity and Law

(continued from page 17)

One of whom Christians claim He fulfills the law—that in Him is the law transcended.

To state that the inquiry confronting Christians, particularly, perhaps, those in the legal profession, is of the connection between divine justification and human law is merely to pose the evangelistic question; to discern how to witness to Christ as the one in whom men are justified to men who seek, often with great passion, self-justification through the law.

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the profound influence he has
had on my life."*

—REINHOLD NIEBUHR *in his Introduction*

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